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The Second Amendment Right To Keep And Bear
Arms is Enforceable Against The States Through
The Due Process Clause Of The Fourteenth
Amendment: McDonald v. City of Chicago
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN GENERAL-
PARTICULAR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS-FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT IN GENERAL-The Supreme Court of the United
States held that city ordinances in Chicago and Oak Park forbid-
ding the ownership of firearms were in violation of the Second
Amendment right to keep and bear arms. The right to own fire-
arms for self-defense is a fundamental right and the Second
Amendment is fully applicable to the states through the Four-
teenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
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I. THE FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF MCDONALD
Otis McDonald, a gentleman in his late seventies, lived in a
high crime area of Chicago where he had to endure violent threats
from drug dealers.1 Likewise, Colleen Lawson, also a Chicagoan,
was burglarized several times.2 McDonald and Lawson, along
with the other plaintiffs in this suit,3 stored their handguns out-
side of city limits, when they actually wished to keep them in their
city residences. 4 However, a Chicago city ordinance blocked them
from possessing a gun without also possessing a registration per-
mit issued by the city.5 Application for the requisite permit was
futile because the same ordinance further prohibited the registra-
tion of nearly all handguns to private citizens.
6
Petitioners, seeking a declaratory judgment, filed suit against
the City of Chicago in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, claiming their Second and Four-
teenth Amendment rights were violated by the ordinance. 7 The
suit was consolidated with two others, one against a suburb city of
Chicago, Oak Park, and another suit against the City of Chicago.
8
1. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3026-27 (2010).
2. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3027.
3. Id. Otis McDonald and Colleen Lawson were joined in the suit by Adam Orlov and
David Lawson. Id. at 3026.
4. Id. at 3027. The Court stated that, "In Mrs. Lawson's judgment, possessing a
handgun in Chicago would decrease her chances of suffering serious injury or death should
she ever be threatened again in her home." id.
5. Id. at 3026. "A City ordinance provides that, '[n]o person shall ... possess ... any
firearm unless such person is the holder of a valid registration certificate for such firearm."'
Id. (quoting CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 8-20-040(a) (2009)).
6. Id. at 3026.
7. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3027. The Illinois Rifle Association and the Second
Amendment Foundation joined McDonald, Orlov, and the Lawsons in the suit. Id. at 3027
n.4.
8. Id. The Court noted, "Like Chicago, Oak Park makes it 'unlawful for any person to
possess.., any firearm,' a term that includes 'pistols, revolvers, guns and small arms ...
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The trial judge denied the petitioners their requested relief and
held that the ordinances were not unconstitutional because the
Fourteenth Amendment did not incorporate the Second Amend-
ment against the states.9
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed relying on extremely
old case law, the most recent of which was decided in 1894.10 The
court of appeals did take note in the opinion that the rationale of
the cases relied upon, did not include the modern analysis the
court applies through selective incorporation.1' The Supreme
Court granted certiorari.
12
The issues the Court addressed were whether the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited
states from strict regulation or banning of handguns, and whether
the Second Amendment is applicable to the states through the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 13 The peti-
tioners contended that the right to keep and bear arms is a right
of American citizenship protected by the Privileges and Immuni-
ties Clause. 14 In the alternate, the petitioners also argued that
the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms is a funda-
mental right that is enforceable against the states through the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 15 Chicago and
Oak Park ("municipal respondents") asserted that the only rights
in the Bill of Rights that are enforceable against the states are
those rights that would be inconceivable to not enjoy while living
in a civilized society.1 6 Further, the municipal respondents ar-
gued, because gun ownership is forbidden in many modern socie-
commonly known as handguns."' Id. at 3026 (quoting OAK PARK, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE §
27-2-1 (2007); OAK PARK, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 27-1-1 (2009)).
9. NRA, Inc. v. Oak Park, 617 F.Supp.2d 752, 754 (D. Ill. 2008) (stating the Court
"decline[d] to rule that the Second Amendment is incorporated into the Fourteenth
Amendment so as to be applicable to the Chicago or Oak Park ordinances."). The trial
judge relied on Quilici v. Morton Grove, which explicitly stated that a ban on handguns was
constitutional. 695 F.2d 261, 263 (7th Cir. 1982). However, the trial judge suggested he believed he
might be overruled when he stated that judges have a "duty to follow established precedent in the Court
of Appeals to which he or she is beholden, even though the logic of more recent caselaw may point in a
different direction." NRA, Inc., 617 F. Supp. 2d at 753.
10. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3027.
11. Id. The court of appeals made no predictions as to how the current Court would
decide the issue using selective incorporation. NRA, Inc., 567 F.3d at 857-58.







ties, it is not a fundamental right that is enforceable against the
states.17
II. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT OPINION IN MCDONALD
A. Justice Alito's Majority Opinion
Justice Alito, writing for the Court,' 8 agreed with the alterna-
tive argument advanced by the petitioners that the right to keep
and bear arms is a fundamental right that is fully incorporated by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.1 9 The
Court reached this result by first considering the jurisprudence of
the Privileges and Immunities Clause and rejecting the petition-
er's claim that the right to keep arms is protected through that
clause.20 In considering the history of the Privileges and Immuni-
ties Clause, the Court noted that since the first time the Court
was called upon to interpret the Privileges and Immunities
Clause, the Court has maintained a singular position, namely that
the clause only protects those rights which arise as a result of the
creation of the federal government.2' The Court maintained this
position that rights existing before the federal government came
into being, are not protected by the Privileges and Immunities
Clause.
22
Although the petitioners urged the Court to overturn the juris-
prudence of the Privileges and Immunities Clause and declare the
entire Bill of Rights applicable to the states, the Court refused.
23
Having declined to follow the petitioners' first argument, the
Court then considered their second claim, that the Second
17. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3028.
18. Id. at 3050.
19. Id. at 3050. Joining Justice Alito in the majority opinion were Chief Justice Rob-
erts and Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas. Id. at 3026.
20. Id. at 3028.
21. Id. Stated conversely, the Court held that, "other fundamental rights - rights that
predated the creation of the Federal Government and that 'the State governments were
created to establish and secure'-[are] not protected by the Clause." Id. (quoting Slaughter-
House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 76 (1873)).
22. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3028. The Court explained, "We therefore decline to dis-
turb the Slaughter-House holding." Id. at 3031.
23. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3030. The Court explained that the "[p]etitioners' primary
submission is . . . that the narrow interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause
adopted in the Slaughter-House Cases, ... should now be rejected." Id. at 3028. The Court
also stated that, "[iun petitioners' view, the Privileges or Immunities Clause protects all of
the rights set out in the Bill of Rights." Id. at 3030. However, the Court maintained its
adherence to the Slaughter-House Cases by stating, "[w]e see no need to reconsider that
interpretation here." Id.
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Amendment right to keep and bear arms is a fundamental right
that should be incorporated against the states through the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
24
This issue was one of first impression for the Court. 25 The first
hurdle the Court overcame in reaching its decision was the asser-
tion made by the respondents that the constitutionality of state
regulation of firearms, had already been positively affirmed in
United States v. Cruikshank,26 the case relied upon by the court of
appeals. 27 Although Cruikshank explicitly held that the Second
Amendment did not apply to the states, the Court stated that the
Cruikshank decision was rendered before the current understand-
ing of the Fourteenth Amendment, and therefore, did not employ
the due process analysis that is necessary today.
28
Under a due process analysis, the Court must inquire into
whether the right asserted is a fundamental right, and to begin
this analysis, Justice Alito noted five principles that have been
used by the Court in deciding due process cases. 29 First, the ma-
jority noted that due process rights and privileges and immunities
are guided by different inquiries.30 Second, the Court pointed out
that only those rights that form the basis of our system of liberty
are protected by the Due Process Clause.3 1 Third, sometimes the
Court has inquired whether a civilized society that did not offer
the rights in question could be envisioned. 32 Fourth, not all rights
24. Id. at 3028. The Court explained that "Lals a secondary argument, petitioners con-
tend that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause incorporates the Second
Amendment." Id. The Court agreed to consider the issue and said, "[w]e ... thus consider
whether the right to keep and bear arms applies to the States under the Due Process
Clause." Id. at 3031.
25. Id. at 3031. The Court stated, "we have never previously addressed the question
whether the right to keep and bear arms applies to the States .... " Id.
26. 92 U.S. 542 (1876).
27. McDonald, 130 U.S. at 3030. "[T]he Seventh Circuit concluded that Cruikshank ...
doomed petitioners' claims." Id.
28. Id. at 3030. Cruikshank's central holding was that "the Second Amendment applies
only to the Federal Government." Id. (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570,
620 n.23 (2008)). The Court also noted, however, that Cruikshank did not "engage in the
sort of Fourteenth Amendment inquiry required by our later cases." Id. at 3031.
29. Id. at 3031-32.
30. Id. at 3031. The Court stated that it viewed "the due process question as entirely
separate from the question whether a right was a privilege or immunity of national citizen-
ship." Id.
31. Id. at 3031. In helping with this determination, the Court spoke of rights that are
"so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental."
Id. at 3032 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)). In Palko v. Con-
necticut, the Court famously said that due process protects those rights that are "the very
essence of a scheme of ordered liberty" and essential to "a fair and enlightened system of
justice." 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
32. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3032.
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in the Bill of Rights are fundamental in our scheme of liberty. 33
And lastly, some due process rights are afforded different protec-
tion from state infringement than the protection afforded for fed-
eral infringement. 34 Although in the past, the Court has used one
or more of these principles in analyzing due process issues, the
majority declared that three of those five principles have faded or
have been eliminated and only two principles guide the inquiry
today.35
Justice Alito then focused on the second principle and consid-
ered whether the right to keep and bear arms is a fundamental
right that is essential to the American system of justice and liber-
ty.36 The Court emphasized that only the traditions and history of
our nation should be considered when deciding due process
rights.37 The Court then found that the right to keep and bear
arms is inextricably linked to the right of self-defense. 38 According
to the Court, the right of self-defense is one that has been recog-
nized for centuries and has always been a part of American tradi-
tion.39 To illustrate that fact, Justice Alito pointed to the recent
decision in District of Columbia v. Heller,40 which held that the
right of self-defense and the right to possess handguns have deep
roots in the tradition and history of this nation.
4'
The Court then revisited the historical carousel that the Court
rode when deciding Heller.42 Starting with the 1689 English Bill
of Rights, continuing through the debates between the Federalists
and Anti-Federalist on the ratification of our Bill of Rights, and
ending with the reconstruction period following the Civil War, the
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 3034. The Court explained, "The decisions during this time abandoned three
of the previously noted characteristics." Id.
36. Id. at 3036. Justice Alito focused on the fact that the right must be founded in our
history and quoted Washington v. Glucksberg, which held that only the rights 'deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition" are protected by the Due Process Clause. Id.
(quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)).
37. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3044. The Court reasoned that considering the rights
afforded citizens in other civilized countries when deciding fundamental rights would be
"inconsistent with the long-established standard we apply in incorporation cases." Id.
(citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 n.14 (1968)).
38. Id. at 3036. The Court relied on its earlier holding in Heller that,"[1]ndividual self-
defense is 'the central component' of the Second Amendment right." Id. (quoting Heller, 554
U.S. at 599 (2009)).
39. Id. at 3036-38.
40. 554 U.S. 570 (2009).
41. McDonald, 103 S. Ct. at 3036.
42. Id. at 3036-38.
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Court revisited the eras considered in Heller.43 In every one of
these time frames, the Court recognized that the right to self-
defense and the corresponding right to possession of firearms ex-
isted and were essential to liberty.
44
Expanding on the historical background laid by Heller, the
Court continued into the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which was
passed by Congress to protect the liberty of newly freed slaves,
and was intended to protect the right to bear arms.45 Justice Alito
then connected the Civil Rights Act of 1866 with the Fourteenth
Amendment, which was also proposed in 1866 and ratified in
1868, and the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment was
intended to protect the rights of those protected under the Civil
Rights Act.46 The Court validated this holding by looking to de-
bates during and after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and showing that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment
considered the right to bear arms to be essential to the free exer-
cise of liberty.
47
Writing for the majority, Justice Alito then addressed the ar-
guments of the municipal respondents, starting with the assertion
that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does
not include the right to bear arms because it was intended by both
Congress and the ratifying states to operate as an anti-
discrimination rule.48 The Court reasoned that if the only true
purpose of the Due Process Clause was to be an anti-
discrimination clause, all of the other rights incorporated through
43. Id.
44. Id. Regarding early English law, the Court noted that "the 1689 English Bill of
Rights explicitly protected a right to keep arms for self-defense." Id. at 3036 (quoting Hel-
ler, 128 S. Ct. at 2797-98). In regard to early colonial law, the Court stated, "Antifederal-
ists and Federalists alike agreed that the right to bear arms was fundamental to the newly
formed system of government." Id. at 3037. During the nineteenth century the Court
noted that the right to bear arms transitioned from being primarily a safeguard of state
autonomy into a guarantee of personal defense, especially to black people. Id. at 3038. The
Court explained that, "[a]fter the Civil War, many of the over 180,000 African Americans
who served in the Union Army returned to the States of the old Confederacy, where sys-
tematic efforts were made to disarm them and other blacks." McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3038.
45. Id. at 3041. The Court explained, "There can be no doubt that the principal propo-
nents of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 meant to end the disarmament of African Americans
in the South." Id. at 3041 n.23.
46. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3041. Justice Alito explained, "Today, it is generally ac-
cepted that the Fourteenth Amendment was understood to provide a constitutional basis
for protecting the rights set out in the Civil Rights Act of 1866." Id.
47. Id. at 3042. The majority concluded, "[lit is clear that the Framers and ratifiers of
the Fourteenth Amendment counted the right to keep and bear arms among those funda-
mental rights necessary to our system of ordered liberty." Id.
48. Id. at 3042.
Winter 2011
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it would only be incorporated if the infringed right was violated in
a discriminatory manner. 49 However, because the Due Process
Clause incorporates rights regardless of whether the rights are
discriminatorily violated, the Court rejected this interpretation of
the Due Process Clause.
50
The second argument advanced by the municipal respondents
that the Court rejected was that the Due Process Clause protects
only those rights that are indispensible in a civilized society. 51
Justice Alito focused exclusively on rights that have been recog-
nized in our nation's history instead of other civilized societies.
52
The Court also disagreed with the municipal respondents' claim
that the right to bear arms should be dealt with differently than
all of the other due process rights because of the deadly potential
involved with firearm possession. 53 The rationale the Court used
to defeat this argument is that many other rights incorporated by
the Due Process Clause also have deadly potential, and yet the
Court fully incorporated those rights notwithstanding any poten-
tially deadly consequences.
54
Another argument raised by the municipal respondents that the
Court addressed is that the right to bear arms ought to be incor-
porated to a lesser extent to the states than it applies to the feder-
al government. 55 The Court disagreed with this argument, and
stated that the Court had already rejected this argument years
earlier.56 The last argument advanced by the municipal respond-
ents was the right to bear arms should not be incorporated be-
cause the reasons for its inclusion into the Bill of Rights differs
dramatically from what makes the right important in today's soci-
49. Id. at 3043.
50. Id. The Court stated that if this interpretation was correct "then the First Amend-
ment . . . would not prohibit nondiscriminatory abridgments of the rights to freedom of
speech or freedom of religion; the Fourth Amendment... would not prohibit all unreasona-
ble searches and seizures but only discriminatory searches and seizures-and so on." Id.
51. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3044.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 3045.
54. Id. The Court pointed out that, 'The right to keep and bear arms ... is not the only
constitutional right that has controversial public safety implications." Id. The Court men-
tioned the constitutional requirements for criminal trials, which if unfulfilled allow violent
criminals to be released, as examples of rights with deadly potential that are nonetheless
enforced through the Due Process Clause. Id.
55. Id. at 3046.
56. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3046. In response the Court stated, 'Time and again,
however, those pleas failed .... [I]f a Bill of Rights guarantee is fundamental from an
American perspective, then, unless stare decisis counsels otherwise, that guarantee is fully
binding on the States." Id.
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ety.57 The Court turned this final argument aside by relying on
Heller, where the Court rejected precisely the same argument. 58
B. Justice Scalia's Concurring Opinion
Justice Scalia wrote a concurring opinion, but he did not write
to give a different reason for reaching the same result as the
Court; he agreed, albeit grudgingly, with the Court's due process
analysis.59 Instead, Justice Scalia wrote exclusively to criticize
Justice Stevens's dissent.60 He wasted no time in deriding Justice
Stevens's analysis, and began by questioning why Justice Stevens
called the Due Process Clause "the liberty clause."61 Justice Scalia
strongly condemned Justice Stevens's approach, arguing that Jus-
tice Stevens allowed too much latitude in judicial discretion in de-
termining what constitutes a fundamental right.62 Although Jus-
tice Stevens listed several things that he argued would work as
constraints against unbridled judicial rule, Justice Scalia criti-
cized each one as being ineffective to keep the judiciary from over-
stepping its constitutional bounds as arbiter instead of legislator.
63
He further accused Justice Stevens of being selective in deciding
what principle of law to apply in order to reach predetermined
goals.64 Lastly, Justice Scalia promoted a historical approach to
deciding fundamental rights, and asserted that although such an
approach is not perfect, it is better than the "judicial Constitution-
writing" approach he accused Justice Stevens of employing.65
C. Justice Thomas's Concurring Opinion
In addition to Justice Scalia's concurrence, Justice Thomas
wrote concurring in part and concurring with the judgment. 66
Justice Thomas disagreed with the Due Process Clause being read
to include fundamental rights.67 Although Justice Thomas did
57. Id. at 3047.
58. Id. at 3048.
59. Id. at 3050 (Scalia, J., concurring).
60. Id.
61. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3051 n.1 (Scalia, J., concurring).
62. Id. at 3051-52.
63. Id. at 3052-54.
64. Id. at 3056. Justice Scalia stated that "[o]nce again, principles are applied selec-
tively" when criticizing Justice Stevens's approach. Id.
65. Id. at 3057-58.
66. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3058 (Thomas, J., concurring).
67. Id. at 3062. When he described the interpretation of the Due Process Clause ac-
cepted by the Court, Justice Thomas stated, "All of this is a legal fiction." Id.
Winter 2011
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agree with the Court's result, he disagreed with the basis of the
decision, and instead would decide the case using the Fourteenth
Amendment's Privileges and Immunities Clause. 68 Consequently,
Justice Thomas rejected the Court's interpretation of the Privileg-
es and Immunities Clause in the famous Slaughter House Cases.
69
After a lengthy narration of the drafting, ratification, and original
meaning of the Privileges and Immunities Clause,70 he determined
that the words "right," "privilege," and "immunity" are synony-
mous.7 1 Justice Thomas then reasoned that gun ownership is a
right or privilege of American citizenship, and should be protected
from state infringement by the Privileges and Immunities Clause
instead of the Due Process Clause.
7 2
D. Justice Stevens's Dissenting Opinion
Justice Stevens wrote in solitary dissent from the Court's re-
sult.73 Justice Stevens did agree with the majority that the Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause should not be used to decide the
case, and he further agreed that the case must be decided on sub-
stantive due process grounds.7 4 Justice Stevens focused on the
Fourteenth Amendment, and what rights it incorporates through
what he calls "the liberty clause."75 Justice Stevens emphasized
that the Fourteenth Amendment stands alone in regard to the
rights contained in the Bill of Rights, and that merely because a
right is in the Bill of Rights, it does not automatically include or
exclude that right from the liberty clause's protection. 76 Justice
Stevens next asserted that rights protected by the Bill of Rights
from federal infringement do not always receive the same scope or
type of protection from state infringement by the liberty element
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 77 Looking to examples, such as the
right to a grand jury being enforced upon the federal government,
but not the states, Justice Stevens argued that many rights do not
68. Id. at 3058-59.
69. Id. at 3086.
70. Id. at 3036-88.
71. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3068 (Thomas, J., concurring).
72. Id. at 3083 n.19, 3084, 3088.
73. Id. at 3088 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 3089.
75. Id. at 3091-92.
76. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3093 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
77. Id.
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receive any protection, or have a lesser level of protection at the
state level compared to the federal level.
78
Justice Stevens also rejected the historical approach used by the
Court to decide whether the right to personal firearm possession is
a fundamental right, and argued that instead of using history and
tradition exclusively to determine fundamental rights, the Court
should determine liberty, and the rights encapsulated therein, in
the context of their application to real life. 79 Justice Stevens
urged the Court to view liberty as a "dynamic concept" that
evolves to adapt to the injustices of the current age.80
Justice Stevens's dissent criticized the Court's holding that the
right to gun ownership emanates from the right to self-defense.
81
Justice Stevens argued that the right to self-defense does not in-
clude the right to use whatever instrument desired in exercising
self-defense.82 After discussing the concept of liberty at length,
Justice Stevens outlined six reasons why he disagreed with the
Court's opinion.8 3 First, he noted that firearms were in a unique
position, because they could be employed both to ensure liberty,
and also to destroy liberty.8 4 Second, Justice Stevens opined that
the right to keep any firearm is dramatically different from all
other rights the Court has recognized as fundamental and that
there was no connection to an existing "liberty" right.8 5 Third, he
noted that other nations that share a common British heritage
with America heavily regulate or outlaw firearms.8 6 Fourth, Jus-
tice Stevens argued that the Second Amendment was adopted to
protect the states and not individuals.8 7 Fifth, he reasoned that
states have a long history of regulating the use and ownership of
firearms.88 Lastly, he argued that even if there is a constitutional
manner of interference, there are important reasons why the doc-
trine of federalism should not allow interference.
8 9
78. Id. at 3094.
79. Id. at 3097-99. Justice Stevens stated that "our substantive due process doctrine
has never evaluated substantive rights in purely, or even predominantly, historical terms."
Id. at 3097.
80. Id. at 3099 (quoting John Paul Stevens, The Bill of Rights: A Century of Progress,
59 U. CHI. L. REV. 13, 38 (Winter 1992)).
81. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3107 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 3107-16.
84. Id. at 3107-08.
85. Id. at 3109.
86. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3110 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 3111.
88. Id. at 3114-16.
89. Id. at 3112, 3114.
Winter 2011
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E. Justice Breyer's Dissenting Opinion
In addition to Justice Stevens, Justice Breyer also wrote in dis-
sent, and was joined by Justice Ginsburg and Justice Sotomayor. 90
Justice Breyer began by attacking the holding in Heller as incor-
rectly characterizing the Second Amendment right to bear arms as
a personal right when it was originally intended as a right of the
states to defend themselves and a right of the people to defend
the states.91 Justice Breyer then questioned the majority deci-
sion's wisdom because of the harmful effect incorporating the Se-
cond Amendment has on a state's ability to govern itself.92 He also
argued that incorporation forces the judiciary to make determina-
tions that are better left to the legislature. 93 The dissent next fo-
cused on the majority's historical analysis. 94 Justice Breyer ar-
gued that history shows the Second Amendment right to bear
arms is not a personal right, but a right possessed by the states.
95
Additionally, he contended that from a historical perspective, fire-
arm regulation by the states was more extensive than the majority
opinion admits. 96 Justice Breyer advanced his historical view by
analyzing different time periods in American history and argued
that in each period, states have historically had a heavy hand in
regulating firearms. 97
III. THE ORIGINS AND HISTORY OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT AND
PRECEDENT LEADING To MCDONALD
The Second Amendment is an area of Constitutional law that
has received little attention from both constitutional scholars
98
and the Court itself.99 One of the first times the Court mentioned
90. Id. at 3120 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
91. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3122 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 3125.
93. Id. at 3126.
94. Id. at 3129-30.
95. Id. at 3131.
96. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3131-32 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 3131-36.
98. Stanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637, 640,
653-54 (1989). Levinson stated, "To put it mildly, the Second Amendment is not at the
forefront of constitutional discussion .... " Id. at 639.
99. Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Political Liberty, and the Right to Self
Preservation, 39 ALA. L. REV. 103 (1987). In the introduction to his analysis of the Second
Amendment, Lund stated, "The federal courts have also been manifestly uncomfortable
with the Second Amendment and, in recent times, have declined every opportunity to give
it the same thorough consideration ... the other first eight amendments have received.
Id.
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the Second Amendment was in the 1857 Dred Scott case where the
Court fleetingly mentioned the right of black people to keep and
bear arms as one of the detrimental side effects of permitting
black people to be citizens. 100 Although the Court assumed the
right to bear arms existed in the states in the Dred Scott case, the
Court did not address the issue directly until eighteen years later
in United States v. Cruikshank.1°1
A. United States v. Cruikshank
In Cruikshank, several white people 10 2 were charged with vio-
lating the Enforcement Act of 1870.103 Part of the indictment al-
leged that the defendant Cruikshank, and others with him, pre-
vented a group of black voters from exercising their constitutional
rights to, peacefully assemble and bear arms.104 In what came to
be known as the Colfax Massacre, a large group of black citizens
were shot by a white mob as they attempted to escape a torched
building.105 The Court rejected the claim that the victims' consti-
tutional right to bear arms had been violated.106 The Court held
that the Second Amendment did not confer a right to bear arms;
that right existed entirely independent of the Second Amend-
ment.107 Instead, the Court explained that the Second Amend-
ment operated exclusively as a restraint on the federal govern-
ment's power, and any actions taken by private citizens that re-
stricted another citizen's ability to keep and bear arms would have
to be determined under state law. 08 The Court concluded that the
Second Amendment operated solely to limit the federal govern-
ment's power to infringe upon the right to bear arms for a lawful
100. Scott R. Erekson, Is the Day of Reckoning Coming?-The Collectivist View of the
Second Amendment is Going the Way of "Separate But Equal," 40 IDAHO L. REV. 757, 772
(2004).
101. 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
102. Brian P. Wilson, How Should States Treat Cruikshank Following Heller? An Analy-
sis Of A State Court's Ability To Hold That Supreme Court Precedent Is Dead, 40 SETON
HALL L. REV. 371, 387 (2010).
103. Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, § 1, 16 Stat. 140 (repealed by United States v. Reese,
92 U.S. 214 (1875)).
104. Wilson, supra note 102, at 387.
105. Wilson, supra note 102, at 387.
106. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 553.
107. Id. The Court stated, "[tihis is not a right granted by the Constitution. Neither is
it [the right to bear arms] in any manner dependent upon that instrument [the Constitu-




purpose and that this restraint had not been placed upon the
states.109
B. Presser v. State of Illinois
The Court repeated this theme eleven years later, in 1886, when
it had the next opportunity to decide a Second Amendment issue
in the case of Presser v. State of Illinois.110 Presser involved the
leader of a society called the 'Lehr und Wehr Verein' who led a
group of four hundred armed members through the City of Chica-
go and was subsequently convicted under an Illinois statute that
required approval from the governor to parade or drill a militia
within the state. 1 ' Presser argued that the Illinois statute violat-
ed the Second Amendment because it restricted his right to keep
and bear arms." 2 On appeal, the Supreme Court upheld the con-
viction, relying on Cruikshank to determine that the statute did
not violate the Second Amendment. 113 The Court reiterated the
holding of Cruikshank that the Second Amendment only applied
to the federal government and not to the states. 1 4 The Court rea-
soned that because it was the state infringing on the right to bear
arms and not the federal government, the statute did not violate
the Second Amendment.115 However, the Court did imply there
was a limit to the power of the states to regulate firearm posses-
sion by acknowledging that the Constitution allowed for the feder-
al government to raise an army using citizens of the states.
16
While the states were free from the restrictions of the Second
Amendment, the states could not severely infringe on the people's
ability to possess weapons to the extent that the federal govern-
ment would be hampered in its ability to raise an army.
117
109. Id. In holding the Second Amendment applies only to the federal government the
Court stated:
The second amendment declares that [the right to bear arms for a lawful purpose]
shall not be infringed; but this, as has been seen, means no more than that it shall
not be infringed by Congress. This is one of the amendments that has no other effect
than to restrict the powers of the national government ....
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 553.
110. 116 U.S. 252, 264-66 (1886).
111. Presser, 116 U.S. at 253-54.
112. Id. at 254.
113. Id. at 265.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Presser, 116 U.S. at 265.
117. Id.
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The Court did not face another Second Amendment case for
many years, but several times in the interim the Court cited
Cruikshank or Presser to reiterate that not all rights in the Bill of
Rights were enforceable against the states and that, specifically,
the Second Amendment only restrained the federal government. 118
The Court maintained this unincorporated viewpoint toward the
states until 2010, and even though the Second Amendment ap-
plied to the federal government, the Court did not directly address
the scope and reach of the Second Amendment to restrain the fed-
eral government until United States v. Miller.119
C. United States v. Miller
In Miller the Court was faced with deciding the constitutionality
of the National Firearms Act. 120 The Act required the registration
of short-barreled firearms, except pistols and revolvers, and re-
quired a two hundred dollar tax on all transfers of such fire-
arms. 121 Jack Miller was convicted under the statute for posses-
sion and interstate transportation of an unregistered sawed-off
shotgun and challenged the validity of the law as an unconstitu-
tional violation of his Second Amendment right to keep and bear
arms.122 In a brief opinion, the Court focused on the prefatory
clause to the Second Amendment and considered whether the Na-
tional Firearms Act frustrated the purpose of the Second Amend-
ment as stated in the prefatory clause.123 The Court looked at the
history of state militias in the United States and the weaponry
used by these state militias. 124 In reversing the lower court, which
118. See, e.g., Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 98 (1908) (stating that, "the right to
bear arms, guaranteed by the 2d Amendment [citation omitted] ha[s] been distinctly held
not to be [incorporated]."); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 597 (1900) (stating that, "the
Second Amendment to the Constitution, in regard to the right of the people to bear arms, is
a limitation only on the power of Congress and the national government, and not of the
states."); Miller v. Texas, 153 U.S. 535, 538 (1894) (stating that, "it is well settled that the
restrictions of these amendments operate only upon the federal power, and have no refer-
ence whatever to proceedings in state courts."); Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263, 287
(1892) (stating that the Second Amendment Right to bear arms was "limited in its scope" to
an act of Congress).
119. 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
120. Miller, 307 U.S. at 175 (interpreting 26 U.S.C. § 1132 (1934) originally enacted as
Act of June 26, 1934, Ch. 757, § 4-5, 48 Stat. 1236-1240).
121. Miller, 307 U.S. at 175 (quoting National Firearms Act, 26 U.S.C. § 1132 (1934)).
122. Miller, 307 U.S. at 175.
123. Id. The text of the Second Amendment reads, "A well regulated Militia, being nec-
essary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall
not be infringed." U.S. CONST. amend. II.
124. Miller, 307 U.S. at 179-82.
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had sustained a demurrer claiming the Act was a violation of the
Second Amendment, the Court held that the Second Amendment
only protected the right to keep the types of arms that would be
useful in the maintenance of a militia. 125 Because a sawed-off
shotgun was not a type of weapon used in arming a militia, the
Court concluded that ownership of such a weapon was not protect-
ed by the Second Amendment, and therefore the Act did not vio-
late the Constitution.
126
Although Miller was the Court's first Second Amendment case
decided in the modern due process era, the Court did not address
the broader question of whether the Second Amendment was in-
corporated against the states through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, and pointed out that most states already had provisions
protecting the right to keep and bear arms.1 27 The Court did not
address whether the Second Amendment applied to the states be-
cause Presser was indicted under a federal statute, and no state
regulation was challenged.1 28 For the next sixty-nine years the
Court continued to rely on Presser and Cruikshank when discuss-
ing fundamental rights, and refused to discuss the applicability of
the Second Amendment to the states in any meaningful man-
ner. 129
D. District of Columbia v. Heller
1. The Facts and Procedural History of Heller
This avoidance of the Second Amendment continued until 2008
when the Court granted certiorari to District of Columbia v. Hel-
ler.130 In Heller, a police officer in the District of Columbia applied
for a registration permit to keep a handgun in his home.1 31 The
District of Columbia had an ordinance that required all handguns
to be registered, and further prohibited the registration of any
125. Id. at 178.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 182.
128. Id. at 175.
129. Levinson, supra note 98, at 653-55. When discussing Second Amendment jurispru-
dence, Professor Levinson stated, 'The Supreme Court has almost shamelessly refused to
discuss the issue." Levinson, supra note 98, at 653-55. For example, when given the oppor-
tunity to review a case from the Seventh Circuit that upheld the constitutionality of a local
ordinance that outlawed the possession of all handguns within the city limits, the Court
denied certiorari. Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F. 2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983).
130. 554 U.S. 570.
131. Heller, 554 U.S. at 575.
112 Vol. 49
McDonald v. City of Chicago
handgun, thereby effectively barring the possession of handguns
within the city. 132 The ordinance also required all other firearms,
such as long guns, stored in any home to be unloaded and
equipped with a trigger lock. 133 When the respondent, Dick Hel-
ler, was denied the permit to keep the handgun in his home, he
filed suit in the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia
seeking an injunction to stop the city from enforcing the handgun
ban.134 The district court dismissed the lawsuit, but upon appeal,
the Appeals Court for the District of Columbia reversed, holding
that the Second Amendment guaranteed a personal right to bear
arms and that the ordinance in question violated that right.
1 35
2. Justice Scalia's Majority Opinion in Heller
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and Justice Scalia deliv-
ered the opinion of the Court. 136 The first issue the majority ad-
dressed was whether the Second Amendment only applied to the
right to bear arms in connection with a state militia.13 7 Justice
Scalia acknowledged that the prefatory clause to the Second
Amendment, which states that the security of the state is depend-
ent upon a well-regulated militia, gives the Second Amendment a
distinction among other rights contained in the Bill of Rights.
138 It
is the only amendment that has a preface to the right.139 However,
the Court determined that this clause, although explanatory of
one of the purposes of the right to bear arms, is not restrictive or
expansive of that right. 140 The majority concluded that the right
to bear arms is a personal right, and that individuals who possess
firearms do not receive constitutional protection to do so only
when in the service of a state militia.141 Justice Scalia also opined
that the right to bear arms was important not only because of its
relation to service in the militia, but that self protection and hunt-
132. Id. at 574-75 (citing D.C. CODE §§ 7-2501.01(12), 7-2502.01(a), 7-2502.02(a)(4)
(2001)).
133. Id. at 575 (citing D.C. CODE § 7-2507.02 (2001).
134. Id. at 575-76.
135. Id. 554 U.S. at 576.
136. Heller, 554 U.S. at 572. Justice Scalia, the author of the opinion, was joined by the
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Kennedy, and Thomas. Id. at 2786-87.
137. Id. at 577.
138. Id. at 577. The preface to the Second Amendment reads, "A well regulated Militia,
being necessary to the security of a free State .... U.S. CONST. amend. II.
139. Id. at 577. Justice Scalia explained, "this structure of the Second Amendment is
unique in our Constitution." Id.
140. Id. at 578.
141. Heller, 554 U.S. at 589.
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ing were even more important to our founders than serving in the
militia. 142 To further show that the right to bear arms is not only
a right connected to military service, but that the right is actually
a personal right, the majority pointed out that the right is re-
served to the people. 143 In every instance in the Bill of Rights
where the "right of the people" is mentioned, the Court has held
that it is a personal right.144
In discussing the history of the right to bear arms in the United
States, Justice Scalia wrote that the right to bear arms pre-existed
the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. 145 The Court then exam-
ined the right to bear arms from pre-colonial English times
through the ratification of the United States Bill of Rights. 146 The
Court found that the right to bear arms granted by William and
Mary in the Declaration of Right is the lineal ancestor to our Se-
cond Amendment right to bear arms. 14 7 Finding that the Second
Amendment conferred an undeniable right to personal possession
of firearms, the majority conceded that this right, like most other
rights in the Bill of Rights, is not unlimited in its breadth. 148 Alt-
hough the Second Amendment does guarantee a right to possess
and carry firearms, the Court was clear that it does not grant a
right to carry any type of firearm, to any place, for any sort of con-
flict. 149 The Court was also abundantly clear that the Second
Amendment does not enable insane citizens or felons to carry fire-
142. Id. at 599.
143. Id. at 579.
144. Id. The other places in the Bill of Rights where rights are reserved to the people
are the First Amendment's Assembly-and-Petition Clause, the Fourth Amendment's
Search-and-Seizure Clause, and the Ninth Amendment's mention of other rights retained
by the people. Id. In each of these places, the Court has held the right to be a personal
right. Id.
145. Id. at 592. The Court stated that, "[tihis is not a right granted by the Constitution.
Neither is it in any manner dependent upon that instrument for its existence."' Id. (quot-
ing Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 553).
146. Heller, 554 U.S. at 593-95. The Court began with the guarantee not to be disarmed
given by William and Mary in the Declaration of Right, which was later codified as the
English Bill of Rights. Id. at 593 (quoting 1 W. & M., c. 2, § 7 (1689) (Eng.)).
147. Id. at 593. The Court stated that "[tihis right has long been understood to be the
predecessor to our Second Amendment." Id.
148. Id. at 595.
149. Id. The majority said, "[t]hus, we do not read the Second Amendment to protect the
right of citizens to carry arms for any sort of confrontation, just as we do not read the First
Amendment to protect the right of citizens to speak for any purpose." Id. Later in the
opinion, when speaking of the Second Amendment, the Court stated, 'The right was not a
right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatev-
er purpose." Id. at 626.
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arms at their will nor does it allow the carrying of firearms in
"sensitive places," such as schools or government buildings.150
In addition to analyzing the history of the Second Amendment,
Justice Scalia considered what the states and citizenry understood
the right to bear arms to entail at the time of ratification. 151 The
majority opinion cited nine states that ratified provisions similar
to the Second Amendment in their state constitutions in the years
preceding and following the ratification of the United States Bill of
Rights. 152 Of those nine states, seven had language that explicitly
stated that the right to bear arms was a personal right, uncon-
nected to service in the state militia.153 The Court also looked to
influential political writers of early colonial times and observed
that the overwhelming majority considered the right to bear arms
to be a personal right.
1 54
In deciding the Heller case, the Court looked to the three prior
major cases involving the Second Amendment handed down by the
Supreme Court, and explained how the holding of Heller related to
the holdings of those prior cases. 155 The first case considered was
Cruikshank, which the Court characterized as being out of step
with current jurisprudence.1 56 Justice Scalia pointed out that in
addition to holding the Second Amendment applicable to only the
federal government, Cruikshank also held that the First Amend-
ment did not apply to the states, an assertion that is clearly con-
trary to current jurisprudence. 157 The Court pointed out that the
holding of Heller and Cruikshank are consistent in that the con-
nection between militia membership and Second Amendment pro-
tection is the same in both decisions.158 Both Cruikshank and Hel-
ler held that the Second Amendment was a personal right, unre-
lated to service in a militia.
1 59
150. Id. at 626-27.
151. Heller, 554 U.S. at 603.
152. Id. at 602-03.
153. Id. at 603.
154. Id. at 605-10. The Court quoted from St. George Tucker, William Rawle, Joseph
Story, Joel Tiffany, Charles Sumner, and Benjamin Oliver. Id. Of these six, only one au-
thor considered the right to bear arms to be reserved to service in the militia while the
others all believed that the right to bear arms was personal. Id. at 610.
155. Id. at 619-22. The prior cases considered by the Court were Cruikshank, 92 U.S.
542; Presser, 116 U.S. 252; and Miller, 307 U.S. 174.
156. Heller, 554 U.S. at 620 n.23.
157. Id.




Presser was the next case the Court discussed in examining its
own jurisprudence on the Second Amendment. 160 Regarding
Presser, the Court stated that nothing in the Presser case refuted
the understanding of the Second Amendment as a personal right
and nothing in the case addressed the scope or meaning of the Se-
cond Amendment. 161 Justice Scalia then read the holding in the
Presser case narrowly to only mean that the Second Amendment
does not preclude a state from prohibiting private quasi military
activity.162
The Miller case was the final prior decision that the Court con-
sidered in Heller, and the majority opinion analyzed the holding of
this case while simultaneously discussing the dissent's reliance
upon its holding. 163 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, point-
ed out that the holding in the Miller case was entirely consistent
with Heller's holding that the Second Amendment affords a per-
sonal right to keep and bear arms. 164 The majority opinion disa-
greed with Justice Stevens's interpretation of the holding of Mil-
ler, which was that the Second Amendment protected the bearing
of firearms while in the service of a state militia, but did not cur-
tail the government's power to regulate personal possession of
non-militia related firearms. 165 The majority instead concluded
that Miller stood for the proposition that the protection of the Se-
cond Amendment turned on the type of firearm in question.
66
The Court also disagreed with placing much reliance on Miller
because of the scarce analysis of the Second Amendment in the
case. 67 Justice Scalia noted that the defendant and his lawyer did
not make an appearance at oral argument in the Miller case, there
was no brief filed by the defendant, and there was absolutely no
mention or discussion of the history of the Second Amendment in
the decision. 68 Rejecting Justice Stevens's reading of the Miller
case, the majority concluded that the holding in Miller was the
narrow proposition that the Second Amendment does not protect
160. Id. at 620-21.
161. Heller, 554 U.S. at 620-21.
162. Id. 621.
163. Id. at 621-24.
164. Id. at 622.
165. Id. at 621.
166. Heller, 554 U.S. at 623. The Court stated that, "Miller stands only for the proposi-
tion that the Second Amendment right, whatever its nature, extends only to certain types
of weapons." Id.
167. Id. at 623-24.
168. Id.
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any type of firearm that is not normally possessed by law-abiding
citizens.
169
Justice Scalia concluded the Heller majority opinion by consider-
ing whether the handgun ban and firearm locking requirements at
issue were a violation of the Second Amendment. 170 In making
this final determination, the Court focused on the self-defense us-
es for a handgun and the impossibility of protecting oneself with a
firearm that is locked.171 The Court then declared that the hand-
gun is the "quintessential" choice for personal protection and that
the handgun ban and firearm-locking requirement violated the
Second Amendment of the Constitution. 
72
3. Justice Stevens's Dissenting Opinion in Heller
Justice Stevens offered a dissent to the majority opinion. 173 He
emphatically rejected the majority's interpretation of the Miller
case, and instead interpreted the holding in Miller to mean the
Second Amendment does not prohibit states from regulating per-
sonal firearm possession. 174 Justice Stevens pointed out that
twelve of the thirteen circuit courts of appeal have relied on such a
reading of Miller and only the Fifth Circuit has rejected that read-
ing in 2001.175 The dissent opined that the Court should, through
stare decisis if for no other reason, reaffirm the holding of Mil-
ler.17
6
Justice Stevens then analyzed the phrases of the Second
Amendment individually, starting with the preamble to the Se-
cond Amendment. 177  Justice Stevens believed the preamble
showed the right was intrinsically linked to membership in a mili-
tia and also showed the founders expected firearm ownership to be
closely regulated. 178 Justice Stevens then considered the phrase,
"the right of the people."' 79 He criticized the conclusion of the ma-
jority that "the people" in the Second Amendment did not include
169. Id. at 625.
170. Id. at 628.
171. Heller, 554 U.S. at 628-30.
172. Id. at 629.
173. Id. at 636 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens was joined in his dissent by
Justices Breyer, Souter, and Ginsburg. Id.
174. Id. at 637-38.
175. Id. 554 U.S. at 638 n.2.
176. Heller, 554 U.S. at 639 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
177. Id. at 640.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 644.
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felons or insane people, because the majority argued that "the
people" referenced in the Second Amendment were the same "peo-
ple" referenced in the First and Fourth Amendments, and those
rights were not reserved to any subset of the population.180 He
also criticized the majority's interpretation of the phrase, "to keep
and bear arms" because of the root meaning and historical impli-
cation of the word.'81 Justice Stevens argued that the phrase
"bear arms" was always a reference to military service, not per-
sonal possession of firearms.18 2 He further argued this point by
looking at the various proposals for the Second Amendment that
were submitted for consideration by the states during the ratifica-
tion process that included explicit mention of the right to bear
arms for personal reasons.183 The final draft of the Second
Amendment that was ratified was drawn largely from the pro-
posal submitted by Virginia, which did not mention personal rea-
sons as a basis for the right to bear arms, and Justice Stevens ar-
gued that by rejecting the other proposals which specifically
named a personal right to own firearms, the first Congress reject-
ed such a meaning of the Second Amendment.184
Justice Stevens finished his dissent by reexamining the Miller
case and criticizing the majority's narrow reading of the case.
1 85
Justice Stevens accused the majority of rejecting the Miller case,
not because of the thin constitutional discussion contained there-
in, but because the majority simply did not agree with Miller's re-
sult or its implications in the current case. 86 Lastly, Justice Ste-
vens argued that declaring a constitutional right to bear arms for
personal reasons would require the judicial system to begin an
exhausting journey into constant decision-making regarding the
scope and reach of that right. 187
4. Justice Breyer's Dissenting Opinion in Heller
Justice Breyer also wrote in dissent for the Heller case. 188 He
asserted that the majority opinion was wrongly decided for two
180. Id. at 644.
181. Heller, 554 U.S. at 646-47 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
182. Id. at 647.
183. Id. at 655-62.
184. Id. at 660.
185. Id. at 677-79.
186. Heller, 554 U.S. at 679 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
187. Id. at 679.
188. Id. at 681 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer was joined in his dissent by Jus-
tices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg. Id.
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reasons that are independent of each other18 9 First, Justice Brey-
er agreed with Justice Stevens that the right to bear arms was not
a personal right, but only existed in conjunction with service in a
militia.190 Second, he opined that if the majority was correct in
granting a personal right to firearms, that right was not unlimited
and could be regulated in a reasonable manner by the states. 191
To support the claim that the right to bear arms should be subject
to state regulation, Justice Breyer pointed to many cities in early
American history that had ordinances regulating the firing of guns
within city limits.1
92
Justice Breyer also pointed to regulations by the states that in-
fringe upon other constitutional rights, but which are upheld by
the Court subject to a strict scrutiny or a rational basis analysis.
93
He then urged the Court to likewise adopt a balancing approach to
determining whether state regulation of firearms is constitutional
without a presumption toward or against constitutionality. 194 The
approach that Justice Breyer used weighed the burden that the
statute imposed against the legitimate objective to be obtained by
the statute.
195
While applying his proportionality test to the District of Colum-
bia's ordinance, Justice Breyer determined that the object the city
hoped to obtain was the saving of lives. 196 To verify the state's
interest in banning handguns, Justice Breyer cited extensive sta-
tistical findings over a thirty year time span in the city that
showed a correlation between handguns and violent crimes.
1 97
Although he did acknowledge that there is a legitimate debate as
to the effectiveness of handgun regulations in reducing crime, Jus-
tice Breyer ultimately concluded that conflicting evidence is better
dealt with by legislatures, and because there is conflicting evi-
dence, it was not unreasonable for the city to adopt the regulations
they did.'
98
Justice Breyer then considered the burden the District of Co-
lumbia was placing upon its citizens with the ordinances in ques-
189. Id.
190. Id. at 681.
191. Heller, 554 U.S. at 681 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
192. Id. at 683-86.
193. Id. at 687-88.
194. Id. at 689-90.
195. Id. at 693.
196. Heller, 554 U.S. at 693 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
197. Id. at 694-96.
198. Id. at 704.
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tion.199 He outlined three interests that were argued by the re-
spondent as reasons for firearm possession: (1) maintaining a mi-
litia, (2) hunting and sport shooting, and (3) self-defense. 200 Jus-
tice Breyer then considered all three interests in firearm posses-
sion and the burden placed upon each interest.2 1 The first two
interests were burdened to a slight degree because the respondent
was too old for militia service and hunting and sport shooting is
conducted outside of the city, requiring only a short subway
ride.20 2 The interest of self-defense, however, was burdened to a
far greater extent, but Justice Breyer contrasted it with the need
of the city police to eradicate handgun violence and the unavaila-
bility of any other rational means by which the city could achieve
this objective.20 3 Having found no other viable means available to
the city that would burden the respondent's interest in self-
defense to a lesser extent, Justice Breyer concluded that the
handgun ban did not violate the Second Amendment.
20 4
IV. How THE SUPREME COURT CORRECTLY INCORPORATED THE
SECOND AMENDMENT THROUGH THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
A. Second Amendment Debate in the Legal Community and Gen-
eral Public
With the McDonald decision, the Court settled one of the most
enduring and controversial constitutional debates surrounding the
incorporation of the Bill of Rights. However, in this debate, the
Second Amendment has not enjoyed the intense academic scrutiny
that most of the other rights in the Bill of Rights received.
20 5
Aside from the Third Amendment,20 6 no other amendment has
received so little attention from the Court or legal scholars.
20 7
199. Id. at 706.
200. Id. at 706.
201. Heller, 554 U.S. at 706 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
202. Id. at 707-08.
203. Id. at 710-11.
204. Id. at 722-23.
205. Levinson, supra note 98, at 640.
206. U.S. CONST. amend. III. The Third Amendment states that, "No Soldier shall, in
time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of
war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law." Id.
207. Levinson, supra note 98, at 640. Levison noted, "Clearly the Second Amendment is
not the only ignored patch of text in our constitutional conversations. One will find ex-
traordinarily little discussion about another one of the initial Bill of Rights, the Third
Amendment...." Id.
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While the lack of discussion on the Third Amendment can fully be
explained by the Third Amendment's lack of relevancy in modern
America, 208 the same cannot be said of the Second Amendment.
Not only has there been a lack of meaningful discussion on the
Second Amendment, much of what has been offered by legal writ-
ers is harsh and has been noticeably one sided against incorpora-
tion of the Second Amendment. 20 9 Some scholars suggest that the
reason many legal writers and law professors have avoided any
discussion of the Second Amendment is that there is an underly-
ing personal opposition to the owning of firearms, and a fear that
academic discussion of the Second Amendment would lead to the
development of legal arguments in favor of incorporation that
would prevail in the Second Amendment debate. 210 Whatever the
reason for the distaste and avoidance of the Second Amendment in
academic circles, the Supreme Court wisely and correctly dealt
with an issue that had been left unresolved for far too many years.
Although the Second Amendment has been largely ignored until
recently by the legal community, the same cannot be said of the
general population or state legislatures. State legislatures have
been active in regulating the manufacture, purchase, and posses-
208. The first and only time a federal court considered the application of the Third
Amendment to the states was in 1982. Engblom v. Carey, 677 F.2d 957, 959 (2d Cir. 1982).
The Court has since stated in dicta that in Engblom the Third Amendment was applied to
the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3035 n. 13.
209. See Wendy Brown, Guns, Cowboys, Philadelphia Mayors, and Civic Republicanism:
On Sanford Levinson's the Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 661, 664-67
(1989)). In response to Stanford Levinson's article, The Embarrassing Second Amendment,
in which Levinson described himself as a "card-carrying member" of the American Civil
Liberties Union, the Yale Law Journal published an article from Wendy Brown, professor
of Women's Studies at the University of California at Santa Cruz. Levinson, supra note 98,
at 638. In the response Brown characterized proponents of the Second Amendment as
being a "man, collectively or individually, securing his autonomy, his woman, and his terri-
tory with a gun," and further portrayed those exercising their Second Amendment Rights
as, "[A] ... sportsman making his way through a case of beer, flipping through the pages of
a porn magazine," and of whom she had:
one great and appropriate fear: rape .... I had no reason to conclude that his respect
for women's personhood ran any deeper than his respect for the lives of Sierra deer,
and his gun could well have made the difference between an assault that my hard-
won skills in self-defense could have fended off and one against which they were use-
less.
Brown, supra at 666-67.
210. Levinson, supra note 98, at 642. Professor Levinson stated:
I cannot help but suspect that the best explanation for the absence of the Second
Amendment from the legal consciousness of the elite bar, including that component
found in the legal academy, is derived from a mixture of sheer opposition to the idea
of private ownership of guns and perhaps subconscious fear that altogether plausible,
perhaps even 'winning' interpretations of the Second Amendment would present real
hurdles to those of us supporting prohibitory regulation.
Levinson, supra note 98, at 642.
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sion of firearms for many years.211 The citizenry of America has
continued to be the world's largest consumers of firearms with
approximately 270 million firearms in the United States. 21 2 Much
debate and rhetoric has taken place in the public square regarding
the scope and reach of the Second Amendment, and the gun de-
bate has birthed the most powerful lobbying group in the United
States, the National Rifle Association. 213 Even the political de-
bates that occur every election cycle almost always touch on the
issue of the Second Amendment with politicians from all parties
carefully crafting answers to curry favor with the majority of
Americans who believe the Second Amendment confers a personal
right to own firearms. 2
14
While public opinion is certainly not determinative of whether a
right is fundamental, the Court is obligated to recognize and pro-
tect those rights that are deeply rooted in the conscience of the
people.215 Furthermore, when the Court correctly identifies a fun-
damental right, the people honor it and the decision will endure,
211. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3135 (Breyer, J., dissenting). In his dissent in McDonald,
Justice Breyer stated:
[I]n every State and many local communities, highly detailed and complicated regula-
tory schemes . . . continue to govern . . . nearly every aspect of firearm ownership:
Who may sell guns and how they must be sold; who may purchase guns and what
type of guns may be purchased; how firearms must be stored and where they may be
used; and so on.
Id.
212. GRADUATE INST. OF INT'L STUDIES, GENEVA, SMALL ARMS SURVEY 2007: CIILIAN
FIREARMS 39 (Aug. 2007), available at
http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/sas/publications/year-b-pdf/2007/CH2-Stockpiles.pdf.
Americans, although consisting of only 5% of the world's population, own 35-50% percent of
the firearms in the world, and of the eight million firearms produced and sold in the world
each year, four and a half million of those are purchased in the United States. Id. at 46.
213. Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, Fat & Happy in D.C. Republicans are Busting Out All Over,
Not Just in Congress and the White House but also on FORTUNE's Latest List of the Capi-
tal's Most Powerful Lobbyists, FORTUNE (May 28, 2001), available at
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune-archive/2001/05/28/303880/index.htm.
The National Rifle Association was ranked as the most powerful lobby group in 2001 by
Fortune magazine. Additionally, the results of the 2000 presidential election are widely
attributed to NRA activity in the traditional Democratic states of Arkansas, Tennessee, and
West Virginia, swinging those states to voting for George Bush, thereby giving him the
presidency by a razor margin. Id.
214. Jeffrey M. Jones, Public Believes Americans Have Right to Own Guns, GALLUP
(March 27, 2008), available at http://www.gallup.com/poll/105721/public-believes-
americans-right-own-guns.aspx. Seventy-three percent of Americans believe the Second
Amendment guarantees a personal right to gun ownership contrasted with only twenty
percent who believe this right is connected to militia service. Even among Americans who
personally do not own a gun, sixty-three percent hold this belief. Id.
215. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 493 (1965) (Goldberg. J., concurring). The
Court must look to the '"traditions and collective conscience of our people"' to determine
whether a principle is '"so rooted there as to be ranked as fundamental."' Id. (quoting
Snyder, 291 U.S. at 105).
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but when the Court is negligent in protecting the rights of the
people, the swell of American sentiment compels the Court to re-
consider its ruling.216 Americans' continued support of the Second
Amendment as a personal right proved that the Court was wrong
in Cruikshank, Presser, and Miller. In McDonald, the Court final-
ly, in harmony with the conscience and traditions of the people,
217
acknowledged firearm ownership as a personal, fundamental
right.2
18
B. Why the Court Was Correct to Incorporate the Second
Amendment
The Court was correct to incorporate the Second Amendment for
several reasons. First, the right to self-defense is a tenet of our
justice system, and indeed is a right that is universal to all human
beings. No other instrument is more appropriate for the exercise
of the right of self-defense than the handgun, 219 and to prohibit
handguns would be to inhibit the ability of Americans to exercise
this right. Additionally, the Court was correct in striking down
Chicago's handgun ban because of the disproportionate effect it
had on the poor and minority groups. 220 In Chicago, wealthy indi-
viduals had the ability to hire armed personal security guards for
protection,221 while citizens of lesser means had to protect them-
selves. It is unconscionable to allow a wealthy citizen to hire fire-
216. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). When describ-
ing the check on the Supreme Court's authority to declare rights as fundamental, Justice
Harlan described it as a balance, saying:
The balance of which I speak is the balance struck by this country, having regard to
what history teaches are the traditions from which it developed .... That tradition is
a living thing. A decision of this Court which radically departs from it could not long
survive, while a decision which builds on what has survived is likely to be sound.
Id.
217. Jeffrey M. Jones, Americans in Agreement with Supreme Court on Gun Rights,
GALLUP (June, 26, 2008), available at http://www.gallup.com/poll/lO8394/Americans-
Agreement-Supreme-Court-Gun-Rights.aspx. A 2008 Gallup survey showed the Supreme
Court's decision in Heller was in accordance with the opinions of seventy three percent of
Americans regarding the Second Amendment. Id.
218. See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3050.
219. Heller, 554 U.S. at 628-29.
220. Kim Janssen & Francine Knowles, Send in Troops? Weis has Doubts, CHI. SUN-
TIMES, Apr. 26, 2010 at 2. Janssen explained that in the first four months of 2010 there
were as many homicides in Chicago as there were American deaths in both Afghanistan
and Iraq, and eighty percent of the victims were African-American. Id.
221. See 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 447/10-5 (2004). The state of Illinois regulated private
security firms and allowed armed guards to be issued the necessary permit to carry a fire-
arm. 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 447/35-35 (2004).
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arm-wielding guards, while prohibiting a poor man from personal-
ly doing the same for himself and his family.
The Court was also correct in McDonald because of the inter-
pretation applied to the prefatory clause of the Second Amend-
ment, which states, "A well regulated militia being necessary to
the security of a free State ... *"222 The prefatory clause was in-
terpreted by the Court as being non-restrictive 223 of the operative
clause, "the right of the people to keep and bear arms."224 This
interpretation of the Second Amendment is consistent with the
jurisprudence of the other rights in the Bill of Rights, especially
those rights that are reserved to the people. When a right in the
Bill of Rights is reserved to the people, it certainly should be in-
terpreted as a personal right, regardless of the fact that the inci-
dental effect is that the state is secured through its ability to or-
ganize and regulate a militia of its armed citizens. The fact that a
citizen's exercise of a right creates a benefit to the state should not
cause the benefit to become the object or sole purpose of that right.
There is nothing in the language or structure of the Second
Amendment that indicates that the reason listed in the prefatory
clause is the exclusive reason why the right to bear arms exists.
The Court has acknowledged that the right to bear arms is a
right that was preserved to the people, meaning the Court recog-
nized that this right predates the Bill of Rights. 225 If a right pre-
dates the existence of the Union, it is illogical to argue that a
state, which came into being after the right existed, is now the
determining factor in whether that right exists in the people to-
day.
C. New Questions Facing the Courts in the Wake of McDonald
Although the Court decisively settled a very old incorporation
question in McDonald, the ruling did open a Pandora's Box. As
predicted by Justice Stevens in his Heller dissent, declaring a fun-
damental right to gun ownership created a whole new set of ques-
tions as to the extent of that right.226 True to his prediction, fol-
222. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
223. Heller, 554 U.S. at 599.
224. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
225. McDonald, 103 S. Ct. at 3030. The Court said, '[T]he right of bearing arms for a
lawful purpose 'is not a right granted by the Constitution' and is not 'in any manner de-
pendent upon that instrument for its existence."' Id. (quoting Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 553).
226. Heller, 554 U.S. at 679-80 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens pointed out
that once a right to firearms for self-defense has been declared in the home, other state
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lowing the Heller case, an immediate burst of litigation ensued,
mostly from prisoners challenging their convictions on Second
Amendment grounds.227
Unfortunately for judges deciding these cases, there are no clear
directives in either Heller or McDonald to determine what consti-
tutes an unconstitutional infringement of the Second Amendment.
Both decisions directly held that the right to personal possession
of firearms does not extend to all places and both decisions list
several presumptively constitutional regulations.228 The regula-
tions that are identified as presumptively constitutional include
restrictions on the commercial sale of arms, the carrying of fire-
arms in schools and governmental buildings, and possession of
guns by felons or mentally ill individuals. 229 Additionally, in Hel-
ler, the Court was clear in stating that these specific areas listed,
where constitutionality is presumed, are not an exhaustive list of
permissible state regulations.
230
The challenge that both judges and legislatures are faced with
in the wake of Heller and McDonald, is determining what regula-
tions are permissible. Both decisions stated that gun rights are
not automatically beyond the reach of legislative restriction mere-
ly because the right to bear arms has been recognized as a funda-
mental right,23 1 but how far does this newly recognized right to
bear arms extend? Certainly gun advocates would prefer to focus
on the last three words of the Second Amendment, "not be in-
fringed" in answering this question, while gun control advocates
would prefer to focus on the first three, "a well regulated.
232
In the debate of how far the government may go in restricting
this newly recognized fundamental right, gun advocates do have
regulations of firearm possession would likely be attacked on grounds of self-defense out-
side the home. Id.
227. Post-Heller Litigation Summary, LEGAL COMMUNITY AGAINST VIOLENCE,
http://www.lcav.org/content/post-heller-summary.pdf (last visited Sept. 26, 2010).
228. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626-27; McDonald, 130 U.S. at 3047.
229. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626-27; McDonald, 130 U.S. at 3047.
230. Heller, 554 U.S. at 627 n.26. The majority in Heller stated, "We identify these
presumptively lawful regulatory measures only as examples; our list does not purport to be
exhaustive." Id.
231. The Court stated:
We made it clear in Heller that our holding did not cast doubt on such longstanding
regulatory measures as 'prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the
mentally ill,' 'laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as
schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on
the commercial sale of arms.' We repeat those assurances here.
McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3047 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 627 n.26) (citation omitted).
232. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
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Supreme Court precedent to argue in their favor. In Miller, ironi-
cally the case that the dissenting Justice Stevens wanted to follow
in McDonald, the Court discussed the extent of the Second
Amendment as applied to federal regulations. 233 With states now
held to the same standard as the federal government regarding
firearm restrictions, 234 Miller potentially provides gun right advo-
cates a powerful argument. Miller held that the Second Amend-
ment permits citizens to possess firearms that are typically used
in arming a militia.235 Whether at that time the Court fully un-
derstood the implications of such a statement or not, it is not a
stretch of logic for radical gun rights groups to claim that this rul-
ing allows private ownership of all sorts of currently prohibited
military weaponry. 236 However, relying on Miller to give nearly an
unlimited right to own whatever firearm a person chooses is not
likely to be a successful argument. In McDonald, the Court great-
ly restricted the holding of Miller to mean that only the types of
firearms that are in common use at that time are protected by the
Second Amendment. 237 If the federal courts follow this guidepost
for determining whether a gun law is constitutional, the result
will be that gun rights advocates will be required to formulate
their arguments against gun restrictions by using examples of
firearms that are not regulated in other parts of the nation. This
basis for determining what firearms are permissible is certainly
subjective and easily manipulated by judges on both sides of the
issue who can, and will, cherry pick which region of the country to
look to in determining what firearms are in common use.
Gun control advocates, on the other hand, also find hope in both
Heller and McDonald. Both cases discussed the right of self-
233. Miller, 307 U.S. at 175-76.
234. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3035. In McDonald, the Court rejected different standards
for state and federal governments and said, "the notion that the Fourteenth Amendment
applies to the States only a watered-down, subjective version of the individual guarantees
of the Bill of Rights" had been rejected years earlier, and that the Bill of Rights "are all to
be enforced against the States under the Fourteenth Amendment according to the same
standards that protect those personal rights against federal encroachment." Id. (quoting
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1964)).
235. Miller, 307 U.S. at 178. The Court stated that the Second Amendment protects
weapons if the "weapon is any part of the ordinary military equipment .. " Id.
236. Levinson, supra note 98, at 654-55. "Ironically, Miller can be read to support some
of the most extreme anti-gun control arguments, e.g., that the individual citizen has a right
to keep and bear bazookas, rocket launchers, and other armaments that are clearly rele-
vant to modern warfare, including, of course, assault weapons." Id.
237. Heller, 554 U.S. at 627. In narrowing the holding of Miller the Court said, "We also
recognize another important limitation on the right to keep and carry arms. Miller said, as
we have explained, that the sorts of weapons protected were those 'in common use at the
time."' Id. (quoting Miller, 307 U.S. at 179).
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defense, specifically in the home, as being a critical reason why
the statutes overturned were unconstitutional. 238 Gun control
groups argue that the language of these cases show that personal
possession of firearms is protected only in the home, and the Se-
cond Amendment does not extend protection elsewhere. 239 Fur-
thermore, advocates of the municipal respondents' point of view
will likely emphasize the caveat in the McDonald decision that its
holding does not threaten every state regulation of personal fire-
arm possession.
240
D. Likely Results of the McDonald Decision
The result of the McDonald decision is largely a symbolic victory
for gun rights advocates. Although federal courts now recognized
a fundamental right to personal firearm possession, by giving lit-
tle or no guidelines for protecting that right, the Supreme Court
has implicitly acknowledged that current regulations in most
states and municipalities are permissible. Federal courts will
likely continue to uphold most regulatory schemes, unless, as in
McDonald, the regulations are so excessively stifling that they
effectively prohibit all ownership of firearms.241 Otherwise, as
long as state and local governments are not altogether banning
firearms that other states are permitting their residents to own,
legislatures will have wide discretion in regulating firearm pos-
session and ownership. The primary change applies to the courts,
who must now simply use the word 'fundamental' in their opinion
when upholding firearm regulations. After all, it has become fun-
damental that in every area of our lives Americans be "well regu-
lated."
Matthew D. Clyde
238. Heller, 554 U.S. at 628-29; McDonald, 130 U.S. at 3036.
239. LEGAL COMMUNITY AGAINST VIOLENCE, supra note 227.
240. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3047. The Court said, "Despite municipal respondents'
doomsday proclamations, incorporation does not imperil every law regulating firearms."
Id.
241. McDonald, 130 U.S. at 3047. In distinguishing the gun regulations at issue in
McDonald from other regulatory schemes cited by the municipal respondents as examples
of permissible regulations, the Court stated, "what is most striking about their research is
the paucity of precedent sustaining bans comparable to those at issue here and in Heller."
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